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Abstract
Algebraic curves over ﬁnite ﬁelds are being extensively used in the design of public-key
cryptographic schemes. This paper surveys some topics in algebraic curve cryptography, with
an emphasis on recent developments in algorithms for the elliptic and hyperelliptic curve discrete
logarithm problems, and computational problems in pairing-based cryptography.
© 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
MSC: 94A60
Keywords: Public-key cryptography; Discrete logarithm problem; Hyperelliptic curves; Elliptic curves
1. Introduction
In 1975, Difﬁe and Hellman [30] proposed an elegant solution to the problem of
establishing a secret key by communicating over an unsecured channel. Let p be a
prime, and let  be a generator of the multiplicative group F∗p. The parameters p and
 are ﬁxed and common knowledge. Suppose now that two users, A and B, wish to
establish a shared secret key. User A randomly selects a secret integer a, 0ap− 2,
and sends PA = a mod p to B. Similarly, B randomly selects a secret integer b,
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0bp− 2, and sends PB = b mod p to A. Now both A and B can use their secret
integers to compute the shared key K = (PA)b = (PB)a = ab mod p.
An eavesdropper who monitors the communications channel is faced with the task
of computing K given p, , PA and PB . This problem has come to be known as the
Difﬁe–Hellman problem (DHP). If intractable, then K is indeed known only to A and B
and the Difﬁe–Hellman key establishment mechanism can be considered secure against
eavesdroppers. A necessary condition for intractability of the DHP is that the discrete
logarithm problem (DLP) be hard. The latter problem is to determine a given p,  and
PA; the integer a is appropriately called the discrete logarithm of PA to the base  and
denoted log PA.
ElGamal [35] later described protocols for public-key encryption and signatures
whose security is based on the intractability of the discrete logarithm problem. It also
became evident that such discrete logarithm (DL) protocols could be implemented using
any ﬁnite cyclic group G instead of the multiplicative group F∗p as long as (i) group
elements can be compactly represented; (ii) the group operation can be performed
efﬁciently; and (iii) the discrete logarithm problem (and Difﬁe–Hellman problem) in
G is intractable. Schnorr [104] ﬁrst proposed using a subgroup of prime order q of
F∗p, where q can be substantially smaller than p. Schnorr’s idea was combined with a
modiﬁcation of the ElGamal signature scheme to yield the Digital Signature Algorithm
(DSA), the ﬁrst digital signature scheme to be standardized [37].
In 1985, Koblitz [74] and Miller [88] showed that (subgroups of) the group of rational
points on an elliptic curve over a ﬁnite ﬁeld are viable candidates for implementing DL
protocols. This was followed a few years later by a proposal to use the divisor class
group of a hyperelliptic curve over a ﬁnite ﬁeld [75]. Cryptographers thus became
interested in computational problems related to the efﬁcient implementation of the
group law and to ﬁnding discrete logarithms in divisor class groups of algebraic curves.
The results of some of this work have been commercialized. DLP protocols based on
elliptic curves were standardized by several accredited standardization bodies including
ANSI [3,4], IEEE [65], ISO [66] and NIST [38], and have been included in numerous
commercial products. Hyperelliptic curves of genus 2 are undergoing intensive study
and there is some commercial interest in using them. Recently, innovative ideas of Joux
[71] and Boneh and Franklin [19] have spurred tremendous interest in developing and
deploying cryptographic protocols using the Weil and Tate pairings on elliptic curves
over ﬁnite ﬁelds.
The purpose of this paper is to survey some recent developments in curve-based
cryptography, with a particular emphasis on elliptic and hyperelliptic curve cryptogra-
phy. We will be selective in our choice of topics, and instead refer the reader to recent
books [8,15,16,60] for more comprehensive treatments. We shall assume that the reader
is familiar with the theory of ﬁnite ﬁelds [80], elliptic curves [112,124], and algebraic
curves [43,112], but will not assume any prior knowledge of public-key cryptography.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The properties of groups that
are desirable for implementing DL protocols are further studied in §2. Index-calculus
algorithms for solving special cases of the DLP are discussed in §3, with a particular
emphasis on recent work of Semaev, Gaudry and Diem. In §4, we describe some
interesting relationships between the elliptic and hyperelliptic curve discrete logarithm
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problems. In particular, we describe some families of curves whose DLP is easier
than the general case. Protocols using bilinear pairings and some related computational
problems are covered in §5. Finally, §6 discusses some avenues for future research.
2. Curves and groups
Recall that a cyclic group G is suitable for implementing DL protocols if (i) group
elements can be compactly represented; (ii) the group operation can be performed
efﬁciently; and (iii) the discrete logarithm problem (and Difﬁe–Hellman problem) in
G is intractable. We ﬁrst consider groups arising from algebraic curves that satisfy
conditions (i) and (ii), and then discuss condition (iii).
Throughout the paper we denote by C a projective, non-singular algebraic curve over
a ﬁnite ﬁeld (see [112] for deﬁnitions). Often C is written as an afﬁne curve, but we
always work with the associated projective, non-singular curve. Let K = Fq denote the
ﬁnite ﬁeld of order q, and let C be deﬁned over K. The (degree zero) divisor class
group Pic0K(C) of C over K, also known as the Picard group of C, is the quotient group
of degree zero divisors (deﬁned over K) modulo the principal divisors (deﬁned over
K). Since Pic0K(C) is a ﬁnite abelian group, cyclic subgroups of it are candidates for
implementing DL protocols. The algorithms known for performing the group addition in
Pic0K(C) for general curves C (e.g., see [64,123,61]) are too inefﬁcient for cryptographic
applications, although they can be used for the index-calculus algorithms on general
curves which we will sometimes require when discussing Weil descent attacks (cf. §4.4).
Instead, one looks for special classes of curves which admit faster group addition.
Suppose now that Ca is a non-singular afﬁne curve over K and that C is the smooth
projective curve associated with Ca . Suppose that C has exactly one point at inﬁnity
(i.e., there is exactly one point on C which does not lie on Ca), and suppose that this
point is deﬁned over K. We denote this point by ∞. Then Pic0K(C) is isomorphic to
the ideal class group of the afﬁne coordinate ring of Ca over K. Working with the ideal
class group is more convenient as it enables a compact representation for elements of
Pic0K(C) and fast algorithms for group addition. Families of such curves for which
the group addition is fast enough for cryptographic applications include hyperelliptic
curves [25], superelliptic curves [51], Cab curves [5], and Picard curves [10,39]. 1 In
the remainder of this paper, we restrict our attention to hyperelliptic curves.
A hyperelliptic curve C of genus g1 over K can be deﬁned by a non-singular
equation of the form
C : y2 + h(x)y = f (x), (1)
where f, h ∈ K[x], f is monic, deg f = 2g + 1, and deghg. A representation of a
hyperelliptic curve in this form is sometimes called ‘imaginary’ since the function ﬁeld
has a single ramiﬁed point at inﬁnity, just like imaginary quadratic number ﬁelds. If
1 The restriction to curves with a single point at inﬁnity is not essential and there have been several
papers such as [94,117] that give efﬁcient implementation results in the more general case.
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the characteristic of K is not equal to 2, then we can assume without loss of generality
that h(x) = 0. The set C(K) of K-rational points consists of the point at inﬁnity ∞
and the points (x, y) ∈ K ×K that satisfy (1). A theorem of Weil implies that
(
√
q − 1)2g  #Pic0K(C)  (
√
q + 1)2g, (2)
so #Pic0K(C) ≈ qg . The cosets of Pic0K(C) can be uniquely represented by so-called
reduced divisors, and we will henceforth identify cosets of Pic0K(C) and reduced di-
visors. Mumford [91] showed that a reduced divisor D ∈ Pic0K(C) can be compactly
represented by a pair of polynomials a, b ∈ K[x] where a is monic, deg b < deg ag,
and b2 + bh − f ≡ 0 (mod a); we write D = div(a, b). The degree of D is deg a.
Cantor’s algorithm [25] can be used to efﬁciently compute the sum of two reduced
divisors and express the result in reduced form. 2
Elliptic curves are the hyperelliptic curves of genus 1. With g = 1, Eq. (1) specializes
to the familiar Weierstrass equation
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x + a6, (3)
where a1, a2, a3, a4, a6 ∈ K . If the characteristic of K is not equal to 2 or 3, then a
linear change of variables simpliﬁes (3) to
E : y2 = x3 + ax + b, (4)
where a, b ∈ K . If div(c, d) is a non-zero divisor in Pic0K(E), then c(x) = x − u
and d(x) = v where (u, v) ∈ K ×K satisﬁes (3). Thus there is a 1–1 correspondence
between elements of Pic0K(E) and points in E(K), with div(1, 0) corresponding to∞. Cantor’s algorithm for adding reduced divisors coincides with the usual algebraic
formulae derived from the chord-and-tangent rule for adding points in E(K).
It remains to consider the hardness of the DLP in divisor class groups. Suppose now
that G = 〈〉 is an arbitrary cyclic group of order n. Since an instance of the DLP in
G can be easily reduced to instances of the DLP in prime-order subgroups of G [97],
we can assume without loss of generality that n is prime. The best generic algorithm
known for solving the DLP is Pollard’s rho method [98] which has a fully exponential
expected running time of
√
n/2 group operations. Nechaev [93] and Shoup [111]
proved a lower bound of (
√
n ) for the DLP in generic groups, thus establishing that
Pollard’s rho algorithm is essentially the best generic algorithm possible for the DLP.
Of course, for any particular family of groups there may be a faster (non-generic)
algorithm that exploits the representation of group elements. Indeed, every cyclic group
of order n is isomorphic to the additive group of integers modulo n with generator 1,
and the DLP in the latter group is trivial to solve. Hence the hardness of the DLP in a
group depends critically on the representation used for group elements. The important
question is whether there are DLP solvers for the divisor class groups of hyperelliptic
2 See [87] for an elementary introduction to hyperelliptic curves and Cantor’s algorithm.
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curves (using Mumford’s representation) that are signiﬁcantly faster than Pollard’s rho
method. This question will be pursued in §§3 and 4.
As mentioned in §1, hardness of the DHP is also necessary for the security of
some DL protocols. There are no groups known for which the DLP is (believed to
be) intractable, but where the DHP can be efﬁciently solved. In fact, there is some
evidence that the two problems are polynomial-time equivalent. For example, den Boer
[17] proved the equivalence in all cyclic groups of order n where (n) has no large
prime factors ( is the Euler phi function). For further evidence of this equivalence,
see [82,20].
In the Difﬁe–Hellman key agreement protocol, one may require the further assurance
that a passive adversary cannot learn anything whatsoever about the shared secret ab.
That is, given a and b, the adversary should not be able to distinguish ab from
a randomly selected group element. An equivalent restatement of this requirement is
that the following decision Difﬁe–Hellman problem (DDHP) should be intractable:
given the group parameters , n and a 3-tuple (1 = a,2 = b,3 = c) of group
elements, determine whether or not 3 = ab. It is easy to see that DDHP is no harder
than the DHP and the DLP. However, there are some groups for which DDHP can
be efﬁciently solved while the DHP (and DLP) are believed to be intractable. One
such family of groups will be used in §5 to construct a signature scheme with short
signatures.
The requirement that n be prime means that the order of a divisor class group
Pic0K(C) selected for cryptographic applications should be divisible by a large prime
number. Hence there is a need for fast algorithms for computing #Pic0K(C). In 1985,
Schoof [105] devised the ﬁrst polynomial-time algorithm for computing #E(K) where
E is an elliptic curve. Since then, there has been tremendous progress in point counting
algorithms for elliptic curves (e.g., see [79,67,102,40,54]), and the problem is considered
well solved. Much work has also been done on the problem of computing #Pic0K(C)
where C is a hyperelliptic curve (e.g., see [73,121,125,57]). We will not pursue this
topic any further in this paper.
3. Index-calculus attacks
Let G = 〈〉 be a cyclic group of order r, and suppose that we wish to ﬁnd log 
for some  ∈ G. The essential ingredient in an index-calculus algorithm is the selection
of a subset F = {p1, p2, . . . , pt } ⊆ G, called the factor base, having the property that
a signiﬁcant proportion of elements in G can be expressed as a product of elements
from F . One then collects linear relations in the logarithms of factor base elements
by repeatedly selecting random integers k ∈ [0, r − 1] until k can be written as a
product of elements in F : if k = ∏ti=1 pcii then the relation is ∑ti=1 ci log pi ≡ k
(mod r). 3 Having collected slightly more than t such relations, it is likely that the linear
system of equations has rank t in which case the log pi can be found by Gaussian
elimination. Finally, log  is obtained by repeatedly selecting random k ∈ [0, r − 1]
3 More sophisticated methods for generating relations may lead to faster algorithms.
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until k can be written as a product of elements in F : if k = ∏ti=1 pdii , then we
have log  = −k+
∑t
i=1 di log pi mod r . The running time of the algorithm depends
critically on the choice of the factor base F , in particular its size t and the time it
takes to decompose a group element into a product of factor base elements.
If G is the multiplicative group of a ﬁnite ﬁeld, then there are suitable choices
for the factor base that yield subexponential-time DLP solvers that are faster than
Pollard’s rho method; this is the topic of §3.1. Index-calculus algorithms for the divisor
class group of hyperelliptic curves are discussed in §3.2. Index-calculus algorithms for
elliptic curves that were recently proposed by Semaev, Gaudry and Diem are outlined
in §3.3.
3.1. Finite ﬁelds
Subexponential-time index-calculus DLP solvers are known for all ﬁnite ﬁelds [1].
We consider the cases of prime ﬁelds and characteristic two ﬁnite ﬁelds.
For the case G = F∗p where elements are represented as integers between 1 and p−1,
a natural choice for F is the set of the ﬁrst t prime numbers. An integer is said to
be pt -smooth if all its prime factors are pt . Trial division can be used to efﬁciently
determine pt -smoothness of an integer in F∗p. The size t of F is selected by balancing
the running time of the relation collection stage and the time to solve the system of
equations. A larger t is preferred because then the probability that a randomly selected
integer in [1, p− 1] is pt -smooth is higher. On the other hand, a smaller t is preferred
because then few relations are needed and also because the system of linear equations
is smaller. The fastest variant of the index-calculus method for solving the DLP in F∗p
is the number ﬁeld sieve [59] which has a subexponential expected running time of
Lp[ 13 , 1.923]. 4
For the case G = F∗2m where elements are represented as polynomials in F2[x]
of degree at most m − 1 (and multiplication is performed modulo a ﬁxed irreducible
polynomial of degree m), a natural choice for F is the set of irreducible polynomials of
degree b. A polynomial in F2[x] is said to be b-smooth if all its irreducible factors
have degree b. Again, trial division can be used to efﬁciently determine b-smoothness
of a polynomial in F∗2m . The fastest variant of the index-calculus method for solving
the DLP in F∗2m is the function ﬁeld sieve [72] which has a subexponential expected
running time of L2m [ 13 , 1.526].
3.2. Hyperelliptic curves
Let C be a genus g hyperelliptic curve over K = Fq deﬁned by an Eq. (1). The
discrete logarithm problem in (cyclic subgroups of) Pic0K(C) is called the hyperelliptic
4 Ln[d, c] = O
(
e(c+o(1))(log n)d (log log n)1−d
)
= O
(
e(log n)
d+)
where c is a positive constant and d is
a constant satisfying 0d1. If 0 < d < 1, this expression is said to be subexponential in log n since
it grows faster than any polynomial function in log n, but is of the form O(2o(log n)). Note that Ln[0, c]
is polynomial in log n, and Ln[1, c] is fully exponential in log n.
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curve discrete logarithm problem (HCDLP), and its specialization to elliptic curves is
called the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP).
Suppose for simplicity that Pic0K(C) is a cyclic group of order r, as is often the
case in cryptographic applications. A reduced divisor D = div(a, b) ∈ Pic0K(C) is
said to be prime if the polynomial a(x) is irreducible over K. If D is not prime,
then D can be efﬁciently expressed as a sum of prime divisors by factoring a(x): if
a = ∏ acii is the complete factorization of a(x) over K, then D = ∑ cidiv(ai, bi)
where bi = b mod ai . This suggests selecting the factor base F to consist of all
prime divisors of degree at most t, for some smoothness bound t ∈ [1, g]. We expect
that for roughly half of all irreducible polynomials a(x) of degree  t , there are two
solutions b(x) to b2 + bh − f ≡ 0 (mod a); hence #F can be easily estimated.
To complete the analysis, one needs to estimate the proportion of smooth reduced
divisors.
Enge and Gaudry [36] showed that if  is a positive constant and g log q, then
this index-calculus method for the HCDLP has a subexponential expected running
time of
Lqg [ 12 , c] where c =
√
2
(√
1+ 1
2
+
√
1
2
)
. (5)
Consequently, for high genus hyperelliptic curves there are DLP solvers that are asymp-
totically faster than Pollard’s rho method (whose running is O(qg/2)). 5
Gaudry [53] also showed that if a smoothness bound t = 1 is selected (so the factor
base only consists of degree one divisors), then the expected running time is
O(g2g!q log2 q + g3q2 log2 q). (6)
The ﬁrst term in (6) is the running time for relation generation. If g is ﬁxed then
asymptotically this is dominated by the second term, which is the running time for
the linear algebra stage. The index-calculus algorithm with smoothness bound t = 1 is
known as Gaudry’s HCDLP algorithm. If g is ﬁxed, then the running time (6) can be
written as O(q2+), Hence Gaudry’s algorithm is asymptotically faster than Pollard’s
rho method for hyperelliptic curves of a ﬁxed genus g5. However, the hidden constant
in the expression O(q2+) depends very badly on g. In practice, Gaudry’s method is
indeed superior for small g (e.g., g = 5, 6, 7).
Harley and Thériault (see [119]) suggested reducing the factor base size in Gaudry’s
algorithm in order to balance the running times of the relation generation and linear
algebra stages. Thériault [119] also proposed a “large prime” variant of Gaudry’s al-
gorithm. More recently, Gaudry, Thériault and Thomé (GTT) [58] proposed a “double
large prime” variant of Gaudry’s algorithm utilizing the double large prime strategy
5 Comparisons between Pollard’s rho method and index-calculus methods are problematic because the
former has negligible storage requirements while storage requirements can be a bottleneck with index-
calculus methods. We will not address this issue any further.
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that was successful in accelerating integer factorization algorithms [78]. Here, the fac-
tor base is chosen to be a subset of the degree one divisors. Degree one divisors that
are not in the factor base are called large primes. A divisor is deﬁned to be smooth if
it can be written as a sum of prime divisors and at most two large primes. Relations
are collected as before, and then combined to eliminate the large primes. For any ﬁxed
g the GTT algorithm was shown to have an expected running time of O(q2−
2
g ), and
so is faster than Pollard’s rho method for genus 3 and 4 hyperelliptic curves as long
as q is sufﬁciently large.
To summarize, it is believed that when g3 the HCDLP over Fq can be solved
faster than Pollard’s rho method if q is sufﬁciently large. This is not the case for
general elliptic curves and genus 2 curves 6 although, as we will see in Section 4,
there are weak classes of curves whose DLP can be solved faster than Pollard’s rho
method. Hence for g3 a hyperelliptic curve cryptosystem would require longer keys,
and would therefore most likely be slower, than elliptic and genus 2 cryptosystems that
provide the same level of security. This explains why divisor class groups of elliptic
and genus 2 curves appear to be the most promising groups for implementing DL
protocols. Unlike their elliptic curve counterparts, genus 2 cryptosystems have not yet
been deployed in practice. This is partly because the group operation for genus 2 curves
was thought to be signiﬁcantly slower than for elliptic curves. However, recent work
on speeding the group law for genus 2 curves [77] and on implementing hyperelliptic
curve systems [95,7,118] suggests that genus 2 systems are quite competitive with
elliptic curve systems.
3.3. Elliptic curves
Gaudry’s index-calculus attack on the HCDLP fails for the ECDLP because all
divisors in the divisor class group Pic0K(E) of an elliptic curve E have degree one.
(Recall that all reduced divisors in Pic0K(E) are of the form div(x − u, v) where
(u, v) ∈ E(K).) A different approach is needed for deciding which points in E(K)
should belong to the factor base. We next describe four such proposals. In the ﬁrst,
due to Miller [88], the elliptic curve is lifted to a global ﬁeld and the factor base is
comprised of points of small height. In Semaev’s proposal [109] for elliptic curves
over prime ﬁelds, the factor base consists of points that have small x-coordinates.
Gaudry [55] considered factor bases that consist of all points whose x-coordinates
belong to a subﬁeld of the underlying ﬁeld K. Finally, in Diem’s method [29], the
factor base is the set of all points whose x-coordinates lie in a particular subspace
of K.
We should mention that most deployments of elliptic curve cryptography use elliptic
curves over prime ﬁelds or characteristic two ﬁelds. Thus, from the point of view of
practice the most interesting ECDLP instances are over these ﬁelds. For example, the
FIPS 186-2 standard [38] for the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm recommends
curves over the ﬁve prime ﬁelds with characteristic 2192 − 264 − 1, 2224 − 296 + 1,
2256− 2224+ 2192+ 296− 1, 2384− 2128− 296+ 232− 1, and 2521− 1. The special form
6 All genus 2 curves are hyperelliptic.
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of the primes enables fast modular reduction. Elliptic curves of prime order over these
ﬁelds provide security levels of 296, 2112, 2128, 2192 and 2256, respectively, in the sense
that Pollard’s rho method for the ECDLP takes roughly this many steps. FIPS 186-2
also recommends elliptic curves over the ﬁve characteristic two ﬁelds F2163 , F2233 , F2283 ,
F2409 and F2571 .
3.3.1. Miller’s index-calculus attack on the ECDLP
In his 1985 paper [88], Miller considered a possible index-calculus attack on the
ECDLP for an elliptic curve E deﬁned over a prime ﬁeld Fp. In Miller’s attack, E is
lifted to an elliptic curve E˜ over the rational numbers Q; i.e., reducing the coefﬁcients
of E˜ modulo p yields E. The factor base F is then deﬁned to be the points of small
height in E˜(Q). (The height of a point is related to the number of bits needed to
represent the point.) However, Miller argued (see also [114]) that there are very few
points of small height in E˜(Q). Moreover, ﬁnding an efﬁcient method for lifting a
point in E(Fp) to a point in E˜(Q) (which is required to map the ECDLP instance
from E(Fp) to E˜(Q)) looks hopeless.
Silverman [113] proposed a variant of Miller’s attack whereby points in E(Fp) are
ﬁrst lifted to Q×Q, after which an elliptic curve passing through these points is found.
It was subsequently shown [68] that Silverman’s attack is virtually certain to be much
slower than Pollard’s rho algorithm.
3.3.2. Semaev’s index-calculus attack on the ECDLP
Suppose that E is an elliptic curve deﬁned over a prime ﬁeld Fp, and that elements
of Fp are represented as integers in the interval [0, p − 1]. For simplicity, we will
assume that E(Fp) is cyclic. Semaev [109] considered a factor base
F = {(x, y) ∈ E(Fp) : 0xp1/n}
for some ﬁxed integer n2. Roughly half of all x ∈ Fp are x-coordinates of (two)
points in E(Fp); hence #F ≈ p1/n.
In the relation generation stage, one attempts to write a randomly selected point
R ∈ E(Fp) as a sum of points in F . To accomplish this, Semaev introduced the notion
of a summation polynomial. 7
Deﬁnition 1. Let E : y2 = x3+ax+b be an elliptic curve deﬁned over Fq , where the
characteristic of Fq is neither 2 nor 3. The summation polynomials fn ∈ Fq [x1, x2, . . . ,
xn] for n2 are deﬁned as follows:
(i) f2(x1, x2) = x1 − x2.
(ii) f3(x1, x2, x3) = (x1 − x2)2x23 − 2((x1 + x2)(x1x2 + a) + 2b)x3 + ((x1x2 − a)2 −
4b(x1 + x2)).
7 Summation polynomials can also be deﬁned for elliptic curves over ﬁnite ﬁelds of characteristic 2
and 3.
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(iii) fn(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = Resx(fn−1(x1, . . . , xn−2, x), f3(xn−1, xn, x)) for n4 where
Resx(f, g) is the resultant of the polynomials f and g in x.
The algebraic closure of Fq is denoted by Fq .
Theorem 2 (Semaev [109]). Summation polynomials have the following properties:
(i) (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Fnq is a root of fn if and only if there exists (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Fnq such
that Pi = (xi, yi) ∈ E(Fq) and ∑ni=1 Pi = ∞.
(ii) fn is symmetric.
(iii) The degree of fn in xi is 2n−2.
One way to decompose R = (xR, yR) in F is to ﬁnd solutions (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Fnp to
fn+1(x1, x2, . . . , xn, xR) ≡ 0 (mod p), such that xip1/n. (7)
If such a solution exists and can be found, then one ﬁnds the corresponding y-
coordinates ±yi . Suppose that each yi ∈ Fp. Then each Pi = (xi, yi) is in F and
by Theorem 2(i) there exist si ∈ {−1, 1} such that s1P1 + · · · + snPn = R. The sign
bits si can be found by exhaustive search, thereby yielding a relation.
Now, a reasonable approximation for the size of the set {P1+P2+· · ·+Pn : Pi ∈ F}
is p/n!. Thus the expected number of points R that have to be selected before a relation
is obtained is about n!. Since a sparse system of u linear equations in u variables can be
solved in O(u2) steps, it follows that the heuristic expected running time of Semaev’s
algorithm is
O(Tn,pn!p1/n + p2/n), (8)
where Tn,p is the time to ﬁnd the desired small roots in (7).
Fix a value of n. Let us imagine for the moment that there could be an algorithm for
solving Eq. (7) whose complexity as p → ∞ is Tn,p = O(p1/n). Then the heuristic
running time of Semaev’s algorithm would be O(p2/n). This would be less than the
asymptotic running time (p/2)1/2 of Pollard’s rho algorithm for n5. Since the hidden
constants in the running time expression O(p2/n) for Semaev’s algorithm grow very
rapidly with n, the comparison with Pollard’s rho algorithm would only be accurate as
p →∞.
Unfortunately, no efﬁcient algorithm is known for solving the polynomial equation (7)
even for n = 5 (in which case the equation has degree 16 in each of its 5 variables).
There is some evidence that such algorithms may exist. For example, Coppersmith
[26] devised efﬁcient algorithms for ﬁnding small integer solutions to a polynomial
in a single variable modulo an integer, and to a polynomial in two variables over
the integers. Coppersmith also mentions that his method sometimes extends to more
variables. However, current methods are not able to solve Eq. (7). Nevertheless, it is
intriguing that the intractability of the ECDLP depends to some degree on the hardness
of ﬁnding small solutions to polynomial equations modulo p.
554 S. Galbraith, A. Menezes / Finite Fields and Their Applications 11 (2005) 544–577
3.3.3. Gaudry’s index-calculus attack on the ECDLP
Suppose that E is an elliptic curve deﬁned over a ﬁnite ﬁeld K = Fqn with n > 1,
and for simplicity assume that E(Fqn) is cyclic. Gaudry [55] considered a factor base
F = {(x, y) ∈ E(Fqn) : x ∈ Fq}
so that #F ≈ q.
In the relation generation stage, one attempts to decompose a randomly selected point
R ∈ E(Fqn) as a sum of points in F . Gaudry observed that this can be accomplished
by ﬁnding solutions (x1, x2, . . . , xn) to
fn+1(x1, x2, . . . , xn, xR) = 0, such that xj ∈ Fq, (9)
where fn+1 is the (n + 1)st summation polynomial. Note that fn+1 ∈ Fqn [x1, . . . , xn]
since E is deﬁned over Fqn and since xR ∈ Fqn . The conditions xj ∈ Fq in (9) can be
expressed algebraically as follows. Select a basis {1, . . . , n} for Fqn over Fq and write
xR and the coefﬁcients of the deﬁning equation for E that appear in the expression
fn+1(x1, . . . , xn, xR) in terms of this basis. Expanding (9) and equating coefﬁcients of
the i yields n polynomial equations
gi(x1, . . . , xn) = 0, for 1 in, (10)
where gi ∈ Fq [x1, . . . , xn] and the degree of gi in xj is at most 2n−1. The solutions
xj ∈ Fq to (10) can be found by ﬁnding a Gröbner basis for the ideal generated by
the gi , and then ﬁnding roots of a sequence of univariate polynomials each of which
has degree at most 2n(n−1). This is predicted to take time O(2cn(n−1)) for some
constant c.
The size of the set {P1 + P2 + · · · + Pn : Pi ∈ F} is approximately qn/n!. Thus the
expected number of points R that have to be selected before a relation is obtained is
about n!. It follows that the heuristic expected running time of Gaudry’s index-calculus
algorithm is
O(2cn(n−1)n!q + q2). (11)
This is exponential in terms of n and log q. However, for ﬁxed n, the running time can
be expressed as O(q2). Thus, for any ﬁxed n5, Gaudry’s algorithm for solving the
ECDLP over Fqn is asymptotically faster than Pollard’s rho method.
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The double large prime idea from the GTT algorithm in §3.2 can also be applied
here, thereby reducing the running time of Gaudry’s ECDLP algorithm to
O(q2−
2
n ). (12)
Hence Gaudry’s algorithm is asymptotically faster than Pollard’s algorithm even for
n = 3 and 4. The constant in expression (12) is the smallest for n = 3. For this case,
it is possible that Gaudry’s algorithm is indeed faster in practice than Pollard’s rho
method for values of q that are of practical interest (2160q32512). However further
experimentation is needed before this can be decided.
3.3.4. Diem’s index-calculus attack on the ECDLP
We can view K = Fqn as an n-dimensional vector space over Fq . In Gaudry’s
algorithm, the factor base consists of points whose x-coordinates belong to the one-
dimensional subspace Fq . Diem [29] generalized Gaudry’s algorithm by considering
factor bases of points whose x-coordinates belong to a subspace of arbitrary dimension.
We consider a simpliﬁed version of Diem’s algorithm below.
Suppose that E is an elliptic curve deﬁned over K, and for simplicity assume that
E(K) is cyclic. Let e3 be an integer, and deﬁne m = n
e
. We randomly select
linearly independent 1, . . . , m ∈ K and deﬁne the m-dimensional subspace Km =
〈1, . . . , m〉. The factor base is
F = {(x, y) ∈ E(K) : x ∈ Km}
so that #F ≈ qm.
In the relation generation stage, one attempts to decompose a randomly selected
point R ∈ E(K) as a sum of points in F by ﬁnding solutions (x1, x2, . . . , xe) to
fe+1(x1, x2, . . . , xe, xR) = 0 such that xi ∈ Km. (13)
The conditions xi ∈ Km can be expressed algebraically by writing xi = xi,11+xi,22+
· · ·+xi,mm, where the xi,j are new variables which take on values in Fq . Then j , xR
and the coefﬁcients of the deﬁning equation for E are written in terms of a basis {l}
for K over Fq . Expanding (13) and equating coefﬁcients of the l yields n polynomial
equations
gl({xi,j }) = 0, for 1 ln, (14)
in em variables, where gl ∈ Fq [{xi,j }]. As with Gaudry’s algorithm, the solutions
xi,j ∈ Fq to (14) yield solutions xi ∈ Km to (13).
Under some reasonable heuristics, Diem [29] shows that if a, b are constants with
0 < a < b, then his index-calculus method (with e ≈ √log q) has subexponential
expected running time Lqn [ 34 , c] for a log qnb log q. Here c is a constant that
depends on a and b. It remains to be seen whether Diem’s method has any practical
implications; the ECDLP over characteristic two ﬁnite ﬁelds of composite extension
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degree is of special interest because elliptic curves over such ﬁelds have been considered
in real-world deployments of elliptic curve cryptography.
4. Links
Instead of directly solving the DLP in a cyclic group G, one may try to (efﬁciently)
embed G in another group H for which faster DLP solvers may be known. An obvious
necessary condition for such an embedding to exist is that #G divide #H . In this section
we present embedding results for the case where G is (a subgroup of) the divisor class
group of an elliptic curve E over a ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq . Four kinds of embeddings are
considered:
§4.1 Embeddings of E(Fq) in the multiplicative group F∗qk of an extension of Fq .
§4.2 Mappings from E(Fq) to E′(Fq) where E′ is an elliptic curve over Fq with the
same number of points as E.
§4.3 Embeddings of E(Fq) in the divisor class group of a (higher genus) hyperelliptic
curve deﬁned over Fq .
§4.4 Embeddings of E(Fq) in the divisor class group of a (higher genus) hyperelliptic
curve deﬁned over a proper subﬁeld of Fq .
4.1. The Weil and Tate pairings
Many readers will be familiar with the Weil pairing on an elliptic curve. To recall, let
E be an elliptic curve over a ﬁeld K = Fq , and let r be a positive integer that is coprime
to the characteristic of K. Let K denote the algebraic closure of K. The set of all r-
torsion points in E(K) is denoted by E[r]; it is known that E[r](Z/rZ)⊕ (Z/rZ).
Denote by 	r ⊂ K∗ the group of rth roots of 1. The Weil pairing is a function
er : E[r] × E[r] → 	r
which satisﬁes the following properties (see [112, §III.8]).
(1) Bilinear: er(S1+S2, T ) = er(S1, T )er (S2, T ) and er(S, T1+T2) = er(S, T1)er (S, T2).
(2) Non-degenerate: For all P ∈ E[r] except P = ∞, there is some point Q ∈ E[r]
such that er(P,Q) = 1.
(3) Alternating: er(P, P ) = 1 and so er(P,Q) = er(Q, P )−1.
A closely related pairing due to Tate (which was presented in a more explicit form by
Lichtenbaum) was introduced to the cryptographic community by Frey and Rück [42]
(also see [41]).
The Tate pairing 8 for a curve C over a ﬁeld K = Fq is deﬁned as follows: Let D1
be a divisor representing a class in Pic0K(C) such that rD1 is principal, and denote
by f a function such that (f ) = rD1. Let D2 be any divisor deﬁned over K such that
8 By the ‘Tate pairing’ on a curve C over a ﬁnite ﬁeld Fpm we mean the reduction modulo p of the
local Tate pairing on a suitable lifting of C to a local ﬁeld.
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D1 and D2 have disjoint support. (One can show that in every divisor class there is a
divisor D2 with support disjoint to D1.) If D2 =∑P∈C nP (P ), then we deﬁne
f (D2) =
∏
P∈C
f (P )nP .
The Tate pairing of D1 and D2 is deﬁned as
〈D1,D2〉r = f (D2).
One can show that the Tate pairing is well deﬁned as a map
〈·, ·〉r : Pic0K(C)[r] × Pic0K(C)/rPic0K(C)→ (K∗)/(K∗)r .
It satisﬁes the following properties:
(1) Bilinear: 〈D1 + D′1,D2〉r ≡ 〈D1,D2〉r 〈D′1,D2〉r (mod (K∗)r ) and 〈D1,D2 +
D′2〉r ≡ 〈D1,D2〉r 〈D1,D′2〉r (mod (K∗)r ).
(2) Non-degenerate: If r | (q−1) then for all D1 ∈ Pic0K(C)[r] except the zero divisor
class, there is some divisor D2 ∈ Pic0K(C) such that 〈D1,D2〉r ≡ 1 (mod (K∗)r ).
The relationship between the Tate pairing and the Weil pairing is the following: Let
E be an elliptic curve over a ﬁeld K = Fq such that E[r] ⊂ E(K) and r3  #E(K).
These conditions imply that the points in E[r] may be taken as representatives for the
classes E(K)/rE(K). Then if P,Q ∈ E[r] we have
er(P,Q) ≡ 〈P,Q〉r/〈Q,P 〉r (mod (K∗)r ).
This relation shows that the Tate pairing is usually not symmetric. The fact that the
Tate pairing is only deﬁned modulo (K∗)r is often inconvenient. Hence we usually use
the reduced pairing
e(P,Q) = 〈P,Q〉(q−1)/rr . (15)
The Weil and Tate pairings can be efﬁciently computed using Miller’s algorithm [89]
and its variants (e.g., see [11,48,32,34]).
4.1.1. Weil and Tate pairing attacks
Suppose now that E is an elliptic curve deﬁned over Fq , and that #E(Fq) = dr
where r is prime and the co-factor d is small. We further assume that r is not equal
to the characteristic of Fq . Our task is to ﬁnd logP Q where P ∈ E(Fq) has order r
and Q ∈ 〈P 〉.
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Let k be the smallest positive integer for which qk ≡ 1 (mod r). The Weil and Tate
pairings (taking K = Fqk in the above) can be used to embed 〈P 〉 into F∗qk [42,83].
For this reason, k is called the embedding degree of 〈P 〉.
Let e denote either the Weil pairing or the reduced Tate pairing (15). The attack
proceeds as follows. Choose a point R ∈ E such that e(P,R) = 1. The existence
of such a point R is guaranteed by non-degeneracy. For the Weil pairing one should
take R ∈ E[r] while for the Tate pairing one can take R ∈ E(Fqk ). 9 Now, bilinearity
implies that S → e(S, R) is an embedding of 〈P 〉 into F∗
qk
. To solve the ECDLP
instance, one computes  = er(P,R) and  = er(Q,R), and then ﬁnds log  in F∗qk
using one of the index-calculus techniques mentioned in §3.1.
One has k ≈ r−1 for most elliptic curves deﬁned over Fq (since k is the multiplicative
order of q modulo r). For these curves, the reduction is useless because even the
arithmetic in Fqk takes exponential time in terms of the time to perform arithmetic in
Fq . However, some special classes of elliptic curves do have small embedding degrees,
e.g., supersingular curves 10 all of which have k6. For such elliptic curves, the Weil
and Tate pairing reductions yield a subexponential-time ECDLP solver.
Example 3. Consider the supersingular elliptic curve E : y2 + y = x3 + x + 1 over
K = Fq = F2n where n is odd. Then #E(F2) = 1, and Weil’s theorem [112, §V.2]
shows that #E(Fq) = q+1−√2q if n ≡ 1, 7 (mod 8), and #E(Fq) = q+1+√2q if
n ≡ 3, 5 (mod 8). By Schoof’s results on the group structure of supersingular elliptic
curves [106], we know that E(Fq) is cyclic. Now,
q4 − 1 = (q − 1)(q + 1)(q + 1+√2q)(q + 1−√2q).
Thus the embedding degree is k = 4 and the Weil and Tate pairings can be used to
efﬁciently reduce the ECDLP in E(Fq) to the DLP in F∗q4 .
Immunity to the Weil and Tate pairing attacks can be assured by checking that r
does not divide qk−1 for all small k for which the DLP in F∗
qk
is considered tractable.
One could also avoid the Weil and Tate pairing attacks by selecting an elliptic curve
E over a prime ﬁeld Fp such that #E(Fp) is divisible by p (which by (2) implies that
#E(Fp) = p). Unfortunately for such curves, the ECDLP in E(Fp) can be efﬁciently
solved [103,108,115,100].
4.2. Isogenous elliptic curves
An isogeny is a map which preserves both geometry and arithmetic. More precisely,
let E1 and E2 be elliptic curves over a ﬁeld K. An isogeny is a morphism 
 : E1 → E2
9 If r  (q − 1) then E[r] ⊂ E(F
qk
) [9].
10 An elliptic curve E deﬁned over a ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq of characteristic p is supersingular if p divides
q + 1− #E(Fq ); otherwise, the curve is said to be non-supersingular or ordinary.
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such that 
(∞E1) = ∞E2 [112, §III.4]. It can be shown that every such map is a
group homomorphism. The degree of an isogeny is essentially the number of points
in its kernel. 11 The endomorphism ring End(E) is the ring of all isogenies from E to
itself.
One of the most important invariants under isogeny is the number of points. Indeed,
the following result holds.
Theorem 4. Let E1 and E2 be elliptic curves over K = Fq . Then there is a (non-zero)
isogeny 
 : E1 → E2 deﬁned over K if and only if #E1(K) = #E2(K).
This result is often known as Tate’s isogeny theorem, but in the elliptic curve case
it was already known to be true due to results of Deuring [27] on the endomorphism
structure of elliptic curves over ﬁnite ﬁelds. Galbraith [44] (see also [49,70]), building
on work of Kohel, Elkies, Atkin and Vélu, gave an algorithm for computing such
an isogeny. If the conductor (essentially, the square part of t2 − 4q where t = q +
1 − #E(Fq)) is smooth, then Galbraith’s algorithm has an expected running time of
O(q1/4).
Suppose now that E1 and E2 are isogenous elliptic curves that are cryptographically
interesting in that #E1(Fq) = #E2(Fq) = dr where r is prime and d is small. Galbraith’s
algorithm produces a composition of isogenies of low degree, so if r is a large prime
then the kernel of the resulting isogeny 
 : E1 → E2 does not contain the order-r
subgroup of E1(Fq). Hence 
 can be used to map the DLP in E1(Fq) to that in
E2(Fq).
There are many things which are not necessarily invariant under isogeny, such as
the group structure of an elliptic curve and the magic number m in a Weil descent
attack. We will give more details about the Weil descent application in §4.4.2, but
for now we mention some other cryptographic applications of isogenies: efﬁcient point
exponentiation [24]; defence against side-channel attacks [116,2]; and distortion maps
for pairing applications [52].
4.3. Hyperelliptic curves
Bauer and Hamdy [14] observed that for any positive integer n, the DLP in an
elliptic curve over a ﬁnite ﬁeld K can be efﬁciently reduced to the DLP in the divisor
class group of a hyperelliptic curve of genus g = n+ n−12  also deﬁned over K.
Let K = Fq be a ﬁnite ﬁeld of characteristic p = 2, 3, and let E be an elliptic curve
deﬁned over K with deﬁning equation y2 = x3+ax+b. We further assume that b = 0.
For any odd positive integer n not divisible by p, 12 the curve deﬁned by
Cn : y2 = x3n + axn + b (16)
11 This is true if the isogeny is separable. For the general case, see for example [112, §III.4].
12 It is possible to generalize this idea so that it applies to all p and n; see [14] for the full details.
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is a hyperelliptic curve of genus g = (3n−1)/2 over K. Bauer and Hamdy [14] showed
that the map n : E(K)→ Pic0K(Cn) deﬁned by
n : (u, v) → div(xn − u, v) (17)
in an injective homomorphism. Thus, instances of the ECDLP in E(K) can be efﬁciently
mapped to instances of the HCDLP in Pic0K(Cn).
For example, if n = 3 then we can efﬁciently embed E(K) in the divisor class group
of a hyperelliptic curve C3 of genus g = 4 over K. This does not make solving the
DLP in E(K) any easier since the Gaudry–Thériault–Thomé algorithm (see §3.2) for
solving the DLP in Pic0C3(K) has running time O(q
3/2), which is slower than Pollard’s
rho method for E(K). Nevertheless, the embedding establishes that the existence of
an Lq4 [d, c] subexponential-time algorithm for the HCDLP in genus 4 hyperelliptic
curves over Fq implies the existence of an Lq [d, c′] subexponential-time algorithm for
the ECDLP over Fq . (A similar statement can be made for any ﬁxed genus of the form
n+ n−12  .) Interestingly, the converse statement is not known to be true.
In contrast to embedding (17), Weil descent attacks attempt to embed E(K) in the
divisor class group of a hyperelliptic curve deﬁned over a proper subﬁeld of K.
4.4. Weil descent attacks
In 1998, Frey (see [41]) proposed a novel approach to attack the ECDLP in elliptic
curves E over ﬁnite ﬁelds Fqn . He suggested to ﬁnd curves X of low genus in the ‘Weil
restriction of scalars’ WE of E with respect to Fqn/Fq . One has E(Fqn) ! WE(Fq)
and can hopefully map the DLP from WE(Fq) to Pic0Fq (X). This approach is known
to cryptographers as the ‘Weil descent methodology’.
4.4.1. General methodology
Building on work of Gaudry et al. [56], Diem [28] showed that Frey’s Weil descent
methodology could be formulated using only coverings of curves. We present the Weil
descent methodology in this ‘covering attacks’ formulation.
Let k = Fq and K = Fqn . Let C be a curve deﬁned over K. Suppose we are trying
to solve the discrete logarithm problem in Pic0K(C).
The idea of a covering attack is to ﬁnd a smooth curve X deﬁned over k such that
there is a non-constant rational map f : X → C which is deﬁned over K. It is well
known that f induces a map (which is also a group homomorphism) f ∗ : Pic0K(C) →
Pic0K(X) (see [112, §II.3]). There is also a map NK/k : Pic0K(X) → Pic0k(X) which
maps a divisor D to the sum of Galois-conjugates of D. In the ideal class group setting
this map is a product of ideals and so is called a norm. We retain this terminology in
the divisor class group setting.
Composing NK/k with f ∗ gives a group homomorphism from the original group
Pic0K(C) to the group Pic
0
k(X) of divisor classes on X over the small ﬁeld k. This map
is called the “conorm–norm map” in the Weil descent literature.
S. Galbraith, A. Menezes / Finite Fields and Their Applications 11 (2005) 544–577 561
There is a possibility that the original discrete logarithm problem will lie in the kernel
of NK/k ◦f ∗. For example, suppose the original curve C is actually deﬁned over k and
the map f is also deﬁned over k (note that the curve X is over k by deﬁnition). Then
we have the commuting diagram
Pic0K(C)
f ∗−−−−→ Pic0K(X)NK/k NK/k
Pic0k(C)
f ∗−−−−→ Pic0k(X)
and, since a divisor class in Pic0K(C) of large prime order will have norm zero, it
follows that the interesting subgroup is in the kernel.
In many cases, however, the conorm–norm map will preserve the DLP instance.
Hence, the discrete logarithm problem in Pic0K(C) can be transferred to a discrete
logarithm problem in Pic0k(X). This latter discrete logarithm problem may be solved
using an index-calculus algorithm.
The remaining question is how to construct suitable curves X over k. The GHS Weil
descent attack addresses this question for elliptic curves deﬁned over characteristic two
ﬁnite ﬁelds.
4.4.2. GHS Weil descent attack
The seminal paper of Gaudry et al. [56] gave the ﬁrst practical examples of the Weil
descent methodology. We give a rough outline of their approach here.
Let N = ln, q = 2l , k = Fq and K = Fqn = F2N . Consider the ordinary elliptic
curve E deﬁned over K by
E : y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b.
We assume that #E(K) = dr where d is small (e.g., d = 2 or 4) and r is prime; hence
r ≈ qn. We also assume that the following condition holds:
n is odd, or TrK/F2(a) = 0, or (x + 1)u | Ordb, (18)
where 2u||n and Ordb is the polynomial f =∑ cixi ∈ F2[x] of least degree such that∑
cib
qi = 0.
The function ﬁeld of E is KE = K(x, y). The change of variables y = xs +
√
b
transforms the equation for E into Artin–Schreier form
s2 + s = x + a +√b/x.
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Let  be the q-power Frobenius map, which generates Gal(K/k). Write ai = i (a)
and bi = i (b) for i = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1. One can form the function ﬁeld 13 F =
K(x, s0, . . . , sn−1) where the si are deﬁned by
s2i + si = x + ai +
√
bi/x
for i = 0, . . . , n−1. Since this ﬁeld is deﬁned as a sequence of quadratic Artin–Schreier
extensions it has degree over K(x) equal to a power of 2; let [F : K(x)] = 2m. The
number m ∈ [1, n] is often referred to as the ‘magic number’. Gaudry et al. [56] proved
that
m = m(b) = dimF2
(
SpanF2
{
(1, b1/20 ), (1, b
1/2
1 ), . . . , (1, b
1/2
n−1)
})
. (19)
Here, b1/2i is viewed as an N-dimensional vector over F2.
Now F is the function ﬁeld of some curve Y over K. Lemma 9 of [56] shows that
in fact Y is a hyperelliptic curve of genus 2m−1 or 2m−1− 1. Under condition (18) one
can show [56] that the action of Gal(K/k) extends to F and that if F ′ is the ﬁxed
ﬁeld of F with respect to Gal(K/k) then F ′ is the function ﬁeld of a curve X over k
and F is the function ﬁeld of X over K. It follows that X is birationally equivalent to
Y over K and that we are in exactly the framework of a covering attack.
In [56] it is explained how to obtain an explicit hyperelliptic equation for X. In
[28,62] it is shown that, under certain conditions, the kernel of the conorm–norm map
has order a power of 2, and so it preserves the discrete logarithm problem in subgroups
of large prime order.
4.4.3. Extending the GHS attack
Galbraith et al. [49] used isogenies to extend the reach of the GHS attack. They
observed that the magic number m can be different for isogenous elliptic curves. If
one is given an elliptic curve E over K for which the GHS attack is not effective then
there are two ways to proceed.
The ﬁrst way is to perform a random walk in the isogeny class of E (i.e., at each
step choose a small prime l and construct a ‘random’ l-isogeny from the current elliptic
curve to another one). At each step one checks if the elliptic curve obtained yields a
small m, in which case the GHS attack can be applied.
The other way to proceed is to enumerate the curves with small m. For each such
curve Ei one can check whether Ei is isogenous to the target curve E. This is easily
done by taking a random point P ∈ Ei(K) and testing to see if MP = 0 where
M = #E(K); if this is true then it is likely that #Ei(K) = #E(K) in which case the
curves are isogenous. If a match is found then one can construct an isogeny from E
to E1 using Galbraith’s algorithm. Once the DLP has been transferred from E to E1
it can be solved on E1 using the GHS attack.
13 Here we use the notation K(a1, . . . , am) to represent the ﬁeld generated over K by the ai .
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4.4.4. Cryptographic implications
In order for the GHS attack to be considered successful in attacking the ECDLP in
E(K), the DLP in Pic0k(X) should be solvable in less time than it takes to solve the
ECDLP instance using Pollard’s rho algorithm. In general, m ≈ n whence g ≈ 2n−1
and #Pic0k(X) ≈ q2
n−1
and the GHS attack fails. The GHS attack will only succeed if
m is small, say m ≈ log2 n, because then g ≈ n and #Pic0k(X) ≈ qn.
Formula (19) was analyzed in [84], and it was shown that the GHS attack fails for
all elliptic curves over ﬁelds F2N where N ∈ [160, 600] is prime. This is because the
hyperelliptic curves X produced either have genus too small (and so the ECDLP instance
lies in the kernel of the conorm–norm map), or have genus too large (g216−1, whence
the HCDLP in Pic0k(X) is infeasible).
However, the GHS attack has been shown to be successful for some elliptic curves
over ﬁnite ﬁelds F2N where N is composite. The following example was given in [69].
Example 5. Let the elements of F2124 be represented as polynomials in F2[z] modulo
the irreducible polynomial z124 + z19 + 1. Let a = z105 and
b = z108+z106+z102+z101+z99+z93+z87+z85+z75+z70+z68+z67+z66
+z64+z62+z59+z58+z56+z55+z54+z53+z51+z50+z49+z48+z46+z45
+z44+z42+z41+z40+z33+z32+z29+z27+z24+z23+z22+z20+z18+z16
+z15+z14+z9+z8+z7+z6+z3+z2+z.
The elliptic curve E : y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b satisﬁes #E(F2124) = 2r where
r = 10633823966279326985483775888689817121
is prime. Two points P and Q of order r were randomly selected from E(F2124).
Then Pollard’s rho method for ﬁnding logP Q is infeasible using existing computer
technology. The GHS reduction with n = 31 was used to reduce the ECDLP instance
(E, P,Q) to an HCDLP instance (C,DP ,DQ), where DP ,DQ ∈ Pic0F24 (C) and C
is a hyperelliptic curve of genus g = 31 over F24 . The deﬁning equation of C is
y2 + h(x)y = f (x) where
f (x) = w3x63 + w7x60 + w3x56 + w3x48 + 1,
h(x) = w9x31 + w12x30 + w8x28 + w13x24 + w6x16 + w6
and F24 = F2[w]/(w4 + w + 1). We have #Pic0F24 (C) = 2r .
The index-calculus algorithm described in §3.2 was used to solve the resulting
HCDLP instance. A smoothness bound t = 5 was selected. This yielded a factor
base F of size 113,728 that was generated in 12min on a single Pentium III machine.
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The linear relations were generated using 379 days of total CPU time on a network
of 208 workstations. Finally, the resulting linear system of equations was solved in 3
days on a single Pentium III machine.
The effectiveness of the GHS attack for composite N ∈ [100, 600] was further
analyzed in [81], where the elliptic curves most susceptible to the GHS attack were
identiﬁed and enumerated. Finite ﬁelds F2N where N is divisible by 5 were shown in
[86] to be weak for elliptic curve cryptography in the sense that the GHS attack can
be used to solve the ECDLP signiﬁcantly faster than Pollard’s rho algorithm for all
cryptographically interesting elliptic curves over these ﬁelds. For example, the ECDLP
for all cryptographically interesting elliptic curves over F2600 can be solved about 269
times faster than it takes Pollard’s rho method to solve the hardest instances.
4.4.5. Generalizations
The basic GHS attack has been generalized and extended in a number of ways.
Arita [6] used Weil descent to reduce the ECDLP over characteristic three ﬁnite ﬁelds
to the DLP in Cab curves. Galbraith [46] generalized the basic GHS attack to hyper-
elliptic curves over characteristic two ﬁnite ﬁelds. Diem [28] further generalized the
GHS attack to hyperelliptic curves over ﬁnite ﬁelds of any characteristic and analyzed
the properties of the resulting curves X in the odd characteristic case using Kummer
theory (see also [120]).
A different generalization was given by Hess [62,63] for the case of elliptic curves
over characteristic two ﬁnite ﬁelds. Hess’ idea is to consider different Artin–Schreier
extensions of the form
s2 + s = x + + /x
(the original GHS method has  = 1). It happens that an elliptic curve E may be written
in the above form with many different choices for , and . The number m can vary
over these choices. The genus bounds are more complicated and the resulting curves
may not be hyperelliptic. Hess’ generalized GHS attack has been thoroughly analyzed
[63,85] with the conclusion that ﬁelds F2N where N is divisible by 3, 5, 6, 7 or 8 are
(potentially) weak and should not be used to implement elliptic curve cryptographic
protocols.
5. Pairings
Beginning with Joux’s work in 2000 [71] (see also [101]), bilinear pairings have
become an indispensable tool for designing cryptographic protocols. They have been
used to solve protocol problems that were open for many years. In many cases, the
pairing-based protocols are very natural and are amenable to simple and convincing
security proofs.
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We begin in §5.1 by introducing some pairing-based protocols. In §5.2 we discuss
some of the computational challenges involved in implementing pairings over elliptic
curves. Some open questions about the DDHP are considered in §5.3.
5.1. Cryptographic protocols using pairings
Let n be a prime number. Let G1 = 〈P 〉 be an additively written group of order n
with identity ∞, G2 be a multiplicatively written group of order n with identity 1, and
let eˆ : G1 ×G1 → G2 be a bilinear pairing that is non-degenerate (i.e., eˆ(P , P ) = 1)
and efﬁciently computable. In §§5.2 and 5.3 we will show how such bilinear pairings
can be obtained by modifying the Tate pairing.
The security of many of the cryptographic protocols that use pairings is based on
intractability of the following problem.
Deﬁnition 6. Let eˆ be a bilinear pairing on (G1,G2). The bilinear Difﬁe–Hellman
problem (BDHP) is the following: Given P, aP, bP, and cP, compute eˆ(P , P )abc.
It is easy to see that hardness of the BDHP implies the hardness of the DHP (and
also the DLP) in both G1 and G2. However, it is not known if the converse is true.
For the remainder of this section, we will assume that BDHP is intractable. Examples
of pairings for which the BDHP appears intractable will be provided in §5.2.
Note that intractability of BDHP does not imply intractability of the DDHP in G1;
in fact the latter problem can be efﬁciently solved. Given an instance (P, aP, bP, cP )
of the DDHP in G1, one can efﬁciently compute 1 = eˆ(P , cP ) = eˆ(P , P )c and
2 = eˆ(aP, bP ) = eˆ(P , P )ab. Since eˆ(P , P ) has order n in G2, one can then conclude
that cP = abP if and only if 1 = 2.
5.1.1. One-round three-party key agreement
The Difﬁe–Hellman key agreement scheme introduced in §1 can be viewed as a
one-round protocol because the messages PA and PB exchanged between A and B
are independent of each other. The existence of a one-round key agreement protocol
involving three parties remained open until Joux [71] devised a simple protocol that
uses a bilinear pairing eˆ on (G1,G2) for which the BDHP is intractable. We present
a slightly improved version of Joux’s protocol due to Verheul [122].
In Joux’s protocol, the three parties A, B, C randomly select secret integers a, b, c ∈
[0, n− 1], respectively. A broadcasts PA = aP to B and C, B broadcasts PB = bP to
A and C, and C broadcasts PC = cP to A and B. All three parties can now compute
the shared secret K = eˆ(P , P )abc. For example, A can compute K as eˆ(bP, cP )a . A
passive adversary is faced with the task of computing K given P, PA, PB and PC ; this
is precisely an instance of the BDHP. Note that the three messages PA, PB , PC are
independent of each other so Joux’s scheme is indeed a one-round protocol.
Joux’s protocol can be easily generalized to a one-round n-party key agreement
protocol using an efﬁciently computable multilinear map eˆn : Gn−11 → G2 for which
the analogue of the BDHP is intractable (i.e., given a1P, a2P, . . . , anP , computing
eˆn(P , P, . . . , P )
a1a2···an should be hard). However, Boneh and Silverberg [22] provided
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some evidence that for n > 3 it may not be possible to construct multilinear maps
from algebraic geometry (also see [33]). The existence of a cryptographically suitable
multilinear map for n > 3 remains an open question.
5.1.2. Short signatures
In most DL signature schemes, a signature consists of two group elements (or two
integers modulo the group order). For example, in DSA [37], the underlying group
G = 〈〉 is the subgroup of prime order q of the multiplicative group of the integers
modulo a prime p. An entity A’s private key is a randomly selected integer x ∈ [0, q−1]
and her public key is  = x mod p. To sign a message m, A selects a random integer
k ∈ [1, q − 1] and computes r = (k mod p) mod q and s = k−1(H(m) + xr) mod q
where H is a cryptographic hash function. A’s signature on m is the pair of integers
(r, s). An entity in possession of A’s public key  veriﬁes the signature by checking
that r = (H(m)s−1rs−1 mod p) mod q.
Several DL signature schemes with shorter signatures were known; for example, see
[92,96]. However, the existence of a DL signature scheme where signatures consist of a
single group element was open until Boneh, Lynn and Shacham (BLS) [21] introduced
the following signature scheme that uses a bilinear pairing eˆ on (G1,G2).
Each entity A selects a random number x ∈ [1, n−1]; A’s private key is x, while A’s
public key is Q = xP . To sign a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, A computes M = H(m) where
H : {0, 1}∗ → G1 \ {∞} is a cryptographic hash function, and S = xM . A’s signature
on m is S. Any entity who has an authentic copy of A’s public key Q can verify the
signature by computing M = H(m) and checking that (P,Q,M, S) is a valid Difﬁe–
Hellman quadruple. This is precisely an instance of the DDHP in G1 which the veriﬁer
can solve by checking that eˆ(P , S) = eˆ(Q,M). Note that a signature S consists of a
single element in G1.
An attacker who wishes to forge A’s signature on a message m needs to solve the
following problem: Given P, Q, M = H(m), compute S such that S = xM . This is
precisely an instance of the DHP in G1. Thus the security of the BLS signature scheme
depends on the hardness of the DHP in G1.
5.1.3. Identity-based encryption
When using a public-key encryption scheme to send a message privately to A, user
B encrypts the message using A’s public key. A uses the private key corresponding to
her public key to recover m. It is important that B have an authentic copy of A’s public
key. Otherwise, if an adversary can somehow induce B to use its public key instead of
A’s, then the adversary could decrypt messages that were intended only for A.
In practice, B obtains an authentic copy of A’s public key from a certiﬁcate. Such
a certiﬁcate consists of A’s identifying information and public key, and a signature on
this data generated by a certifying authority (CA). The authenticity of the certiﬁcate
(and thus also A’s public key) can be determined by using the CAs public key to verify
the signature. Thus, B a priori only needs an authentic copy of the CAs public key.
There are many practical difﬁculties with managing public keys and certiﬁcates in
large-scale deployments of public-key cryptography. In practice, it may be cumbersome
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for B to obtain A’s certiﬁcate. Indeed, A may have not yet enrolled in the system
and selected a public key. In order to alleviate some of the problems inherent with
managing public keys and certiﬁcates, Shamir [110] in 1984 introduced the notion of
identity-based cryptography. Here, a trusted-third party (TTP) has a public key and a
private key. An entity A’s public key consists of its identifying information IDA (such
as A’s name or email address). The TTP uses her private key to generate A’s private
key, and securely transmits this to A. Clearly the TTP has to be well trusted since it
knows all private keys. Any other entity can generate A’s public key solely from IDA,
and without obtaining any authenticated data from A.
Shamir proposed an identity-based signature scheme in his 1984 paper. The existence
of a practical identity-based encryption scheme remained open until Boneh and Franklin
[19] proposed their elegant pairing-based scheme in 2001. This scheme is described
next.
Let eˆ be a bilinear pairing on (G1,G2) for which the BDHP is hard. Let H1 be
a cryptographic hash function that maps bit strings to G1 \ {∞}. The TTP selects a
private key s at random from [1, n − 1], and computes its public key Q = sP . It is
assumed that all entities have an authentic copy of Q. A’s private key is dA = sQA,
where QA = H1(IDA). Note that computing dA from (P,Q,QA) is an instance of the
DHP in G1. Thus the TTP is the only entity who can compute dA.
An entity B encrypts a message m ∈ G2 for A as follows. B randomly selects an
integer r ∈ [1, n−1] and computes QA = H1(IDA), C1 = rP , and C2 = m+eˆ(QA,Q)r .
B then sends the ciphertext (C1, C2) to A. Note that
eˆ(dA, C1) = eˆ(sQA, rP ) = eˆ(QA, sP )r = eˆ(QA,Q)r .
Thus A can recover m from (C1, C2) by using her private key dA to compute
m = C2 − eˆ(dA, C1).
An attacker who tries to recover m from (C1, C2) has to compute eˆ(QA,Q)r from
(P,QA,Q,C1). This is precisely an instance of the BDHP.
5.2. Pairing-friendly elliptic curves
Bilinear pairings can be designed using the Weil or Tate pairings on elliptic curves.
We will restrict our discussion to the Tate pairing because it is generally faster to
evaluate than the Weil pairing, and also is more suitable when using curves of genus
greater than 1.
There are two conditions that an elliptic curve E deﬁned over Fq must satisfy in
order to be considered suitable for pairing applications:
(1) #E(Fq) should be divisible by a sufﬁciently large prime r so that the DLP in the
order-r subgroup of E(Fq) is resistant to Pollard’s rho attack (and other known
attacks).
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(2) Let k be the smallest positive integer such that r | (qk−1). Then the embedding de-
gree k should be sufﬁciently large so that the DLP in F∗
qk
withstands index-calculus
attacks, but small enough that arithmetic in Fqk can be efﬁciently implemented.
Supersingular elliptic curves provide good examples (cf. §4.1). The largest value
for k that can be attained in the supersingular case is 6 and this can be realized
using supersingular elliptic curves in characteristic three. For example, consider the
supersingular curve E over F3 with deﬁning equation y2 = x3− x+ 1 (cf. Example 9).
Then for odd m, E(F3m) has embedding degree k = 6. Since #E(F397) ≈ 2151 is prime
and the DLP in F3582 is considered intractable, E(F397) is a viable candidate for pairing
applications.
Supersingular curves of genus g > 1 can also be used, but there are still limitations
on the embedding degrees which can be obtained (see [45,99] for details).
If a value of k larger than 6 is preferred, then we are led to consider ordinary elliptic
curves. We ﬁrst consider whether suitable curves exist and then how to construct them.
5.2.1. Existence
The ﬁrst results are due to Balasubramanian and Koblitz [9]. They considered the
probability that a randomly chosen isogeny class of an elliptic curve E deﬁned over
Fp with r = #E(Fp) a prime has embedding degree k (small). Note that they did not
have to consider supersingular curves since such curves over Fp have p + 1 points
(which is not prime) when p5. Their result is that if M/2pM and k < (logp)2
then the probability is at most c(logM)9(log logM)2/M . Since there are O(M/ logM)
choices for p and O(
√
M) isogeny classes of curves for each p, it follows that the
expected number of isogeny classes of elliptic curves over Fp with M/2pM and
with embedding degree (logM)2 is O(
√
M) (up to polynomial terms).
A related argument is given in [50]. Let 3k(logM)2. Then the expected number
of pairs (q, n), where n is a possible group order (not necessarily prime) of an elliptic
curve deﬁned over Fq , where M/2 < q < M is a prime or prime power and where
n | (qk−1), is proportional to √M (up to polynomial terms). This should be compared
with the total number of pairs (q, n) without any embedding degree condition, which
is O(M3/2).
Note that when k > 3 then the supersingular curves only occur over ﬁelds of small
characteristic and so they contribute a negligible proportion of examples. When k = 3
one gets supersingular curves over Fp2 , but this again contributes only O(
√
M) many
curves.
These arguments suggest that ordinary curves suitable for pairing-based cryptography
do exist, but that they are rather scarce. For example, we believe that if 3k(logM)2
then only for O(
√
M) of the primes pM would there be curves over Fp with
embedding degree k.
5.2.2. Construction
The problem of ﬁnding ordinary curves was considered by Miyaji, Nakabayashi and
Takano (MNT) [90]. They presented explicit families of group orders of ordinary elliptic
curves with embedding degree 3, 4 and 6.
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Table 1
MNT families of elliptic curves
k q(l) t (l) n(l)
3 12l2 − 1 −1± 6l 12l2 ± 6l + 1
4 l2 + l + 1 −l, l + 1 l2 + 2l + 2, l2 + 1
6 4l2 + 1 1± 2l 4l2 ± 2l + 1
More precisely, they give polynomials q(l) and t (l) in Z[l] such that the polyno-
mial n(l) = q(l) + 1 − t (l) divides the polynomial k(q(l)), where k(x) is the k-th
cyclotomic polynomial. For any integer l such that q = q(l) is a prime (or prime
power) and such that |t (l)|2√q, there is an elliptic curve E deﬁned over Fq with
n(l) points and embedding degree k. The families they obtained are presented in Ta-
ble 1. Due to the arguments presented in §5.2.1, we expect these families to be some-
what sparse, and this is perfectly reﬂected by the fact that the polynomials q(l) are
quadratic.
Conjecturally these families contain an inﬁnite number of primes or prime powers
q. These results have been generalized by Scott and Barreto [107] and Galbraith et
al. [50]. More general ways to construct ordinary elliptic curves suitable for pairings
with k > 6 have been given by several authors [12,13,23,31]. The drawback of these
methods is that the group orders of the elliptic curves produced generally have large
co-factor d. For example, Brezing and Weng [23] construct elliptic curves deﬁned
over Fq with k = 8 and 24 and where the bitlength of d is approximately one-ﬁfth
the bitlength of q. An important research problem is to construct ordinary elliptic
curves with embedding degree 6 < k < 32 whose group orders are prime or almost
prime.
A different approach to dealing with the limitations of supersingular curves has
been adopted by Rubin and Silverberg [99]. They essentially give a way to compress
points in subgroups of supersingular curves which improves the bandwidth. As a result,
one can take a supersingular curve over a larger ﬁeld without paying such a band-
width penalty, and this is similar to using an ordinary curve with a larger embedding
degree.
5.3. Distortion maps and DDHP
Let E be an elliptic curve deﬁned over Fq , and let r be a prime such that gcd(r, q) =
1. The set of r-torsion points E[r] is a two dimensional vector space over Fr . Recall
that the Weil pairing is alternating (i.e., er(P, P ) = 1 for all points P ∈ E[r]). Since
the Tate pairing is deﬁned on two different groups, it does not necessarily make sense
to consider the value 〈P,P 〉r . However, in the cases most relevant to cryptography one
can use E[r] as representatives for the right-hand argument, and so it is reasonable to
consider the Tate pairing as being deﬁned on E[r] × E[r]. From now on we assume
this is the case. The Tate pairing is not necessarily alternating, but there are plenty of
situations where a point P paired with itself is trivial.
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The bilinear pairings we need must satisfy eˆ(P , P ) = 1 for certain points P. One
very common way to ensure this is to ‘twist’ the Tate pairing by some endomorphism

. In other words, we deﬁne
eˆ(P ,Q) := 〈P,
(Q)〉(qk−1)/rr .
An endomorphism 
 such that 〈P,
(P )〉r = 1 is called a distortion map for the point
P. The aim of this section is to give some examples of distortion maps.
For the remainder of this section we consider the reduced Tate pairing e(P,Q) =
〈P,Q〉(qk−1)/rr , but all results also hold if e(P,Q) is replaced by the Weil pairing
er(P,Q).
Lemma 7. Let E be an elliptic curve deﬁned over Fq , and let r | #E(Fq) be a prime
such that the order-r subgroup of E(Fq) has embedding degree k. If {P,Q} is a basis
for E[r] and e(P, P ) = 1, then e(P,Q) = 1.
Proof. If e(P,Q) = 1 then e(P, aP + bQ) = e(P, P )ae(P,Q)b = 1, but this contra-
dicts non-degeneracy. 
We now give some examples of distortion maps.
Example 8. Let E : y2 = x3 − x be an elliptic curve deﬁned over Fp where p ≡ 3
(mod 4). Then #E(Fp) = p + 1 and E is supersingular. Suppose r is a large prime
dividing p + 1. Let i ∈ Fp2 be such that i2 = −1 and deﬁne the automorphism

 : (x, y) → (−x, iy) on E. One can show that 
2 = −1 on E and that End(E) is an
order in the division algebra Q(,
) deﬁned by 2 = −p, 
2 = −1 and 
 = −

(so  is the Frobenius).
The embedding degree of E(Fp) is 2, and E(Fp2)E(Fp)×E(Fp) as a group. Let
P = (x, y) ∈ E(Fp) be a point of order r. If r > 2 then y = 0. Now e(P, P ) ∈ Fp
and so e(P, P ) = 1. But 
(P ) ∈ E(Fp2) \E(Fp) has order r and so {P,
(P )} forms
a basis for E[r]. By Lemma 7 we have e(P,
(P )) = 1.
Example 9. Consider the elliptic curve Eb : y2 = x3 − x + b deﬁned over F3 where
b = ±1. This curve is supersingular and one can check that for gcd(n, 6) = 1 the
group orders are
#Eb(F3n) = 3n + 3(n+1)/2 + 1,
where  = 1 if either b = 1 and n ≡ 1, 11 (mod 12), or b = −1 and n ≡ 5, 7
(mod 12), and  = −1 otherwise. It follows that the embedding degree is k = 6.
A useful distortion map is deﬁned as follows. Let i ∈ F32 be such that i2 = −1 and
 ∈ F33 be such that 3 −  − b = 0. Then the map 
 : (x, y) → ( − x, iy) is an
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automorphism of the curve deﬁned over F36 which satisﬁes 
2 = −1. If P ∈ E(F3n)
has order greater than 2 then 
(P ) ∈ E(F36n) \ E(F3n) and e(P,
(P )) = 1.
Example 10. Let E be an elliptic curve deﬁned over Fq such that there is a large
prime r | #E(Fq). Suppose that the embedding degree of the subgroup of order r is k
and assume k < r . Let P ∈ E(Fqk ) be such that e(P, P ) = 1. Deﬁne the trace map
Tr(P ) =
k−1∑
i=0
i (P ), (20)
where  is the q-power Frobenius map. Note that Tr(P ) ∈ E(Fq). The trace map is
a group homomorphism, so Tr(P ) has order dividing r. If {P,Tr(P )} is a basis for
E[r] then e(P,Tr(P )) = 1 and so the trace map can be used as a distortion map for
P. Indeed, the Frobenius map  itself can be used as a distortion map, but there are
usually good implementation reasons to use the full trace.
It is easy to see that Tr(P ) ∈ 〈P 〉 if (P ) = P for some integer . Indeed, one
can show that {P,Tr(P )} is a basis for E[r] if and only if P is not a -eigenvector
(see [47] for details). Note that if r | #E(Fq) then the -eigenvalues are 1 and q. The
1-eigenspace is just E(Fq)[r].
The use of the trace map is completely general and can be applied for both ordinary
and supersingular curves. The following result of Schoof and Verheul [122] classiﬁes
when a distortion map for a point P exists.
Theorem 11. Let E be an elliptic curve over Fq , let r be a prime and suppose that
E[r] ⊆ E(Fqk ). Let P ∈ E(Fqk ) have order r and be such that e(P, P ) = 1.
(i) If E is supersingular then there is a distortion map 
 such that e(P,
(P )) = 1.
(ii) If E is ordinary and if P is not a -eigenvector then there is a distortion map
(namely, the trace map) 
 such that e(P,
(P )) = 1.
Galbraith and Rotger [52] give an algorithm to construct a suitable distortion map for
any given supersingular elliptic curve. Hence, we can conclude that DDHP is easy for
supersingular curves and for all subgroups of ordinary curves (having low embedding
degree) except for the Frobenius eigenspaces. However, DDHP appears to be hard for
the two Frobenius eigenspaces on an ordinary elliptic curve. This property has been
used by Boneh et al. [18, §8.1].
One potential way to attack DDHP in the ordinary case would be to try to ‘invert’
the trace map. Let P ∈ E(Fq)[r] where k > 1, and so e(P, P ) = 1. There are many
points Q such that Tr(Q) = P . For example, take Q = k−1P ; but this still satisﬁes
e(P,Q) = 1. Another possibility is to choose a random point R ∈ E(Fqk ), set R′ =
Tr(R) and set Q = k−1(P +R′)−R. If e(P,R) = 1 then e(P,Q) = 1. The difﬁculty
is to ﬁnd an inverse t (P ) = Q to the trace map on 〈P 〉 such that e(P, t (P )) = 1 and
t (nP ) = n(t (P )). Finding such a map, or proving the impossibility of such a map,
remains an open problem.
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6. Future research
There are many research directions that one can pursue in discrete logarithm cryp-
tography. The question that is the most fundamental from a practical perspective is the
existence of faster algorithms for solving the ECDLP. In particular, more work is needed
to fully understand the practical implications of the Weil descent methodology and of
Gaudry and Diem’s index-calculus methods (and possible variants) for the ECDLP. A
worthwhile objective is to ﬁnd an example of a ﬁeld Fq that is bad for elliptic curve
cryptography in the sense that Pollard’s rho method for solving the hardest instances
of the ECDLP over Fq is intractable, but there are ECDLP solvers that can solve all
instances of the ECDLP over Fq using existing computer resources.
Genus two curves have received much attention in recent years. Hence it is important
that the same questions be investigated for genus two curves.
The fundamental question in pairing-based cryptography is the hardness of the BDHP.
The only viable constructions known for bilinear pairings are from elliptic curves (and,
more generally, abelian varieties) that have small embedding degree. These curves
were judged to be weak for elliptic curve cryptography in the early 1990s after the
discovery of the Weil and Tate pairing attacks and thus the cryptographic community
did not pay any further attention to the hardness of the ECDLP for these curves. More
investigation of the ECDLP (and BDHP) for these curves is needed in order to increase
our conﬁdence in the security of pairing-based cryptographic systems.
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